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a b s t r a c t
The price of capital is a key determinant of the financial accelerator, a transmission mechanism of shocks
generated through the capital accumulation process of entrepreneurs that borrow in credit markets with
frictions. This paper shows that the procedure of approximating the price of old capital by the net-of-
depreciation price of new capital, as used in many articles since Bernanke et al. (1999), has profound
implications when the capital depreciation rate is positive. When accounting for the appropriate price of
capital, the effects of the financial accelerator are even stronger than originally assessed.1. Introduction
Frictions in financial and credit markets can create a powerful
propagation and amplification channel for the transmission of
various shocks to the real economy. In their seminal contribution
(Bernanke et al., 1999) (henceforth, BGG) design a general
equilibrium model in which asymmetric information between
borrowers and lenders arises from a costly state verification
problem, as first studied in Townsend (1979). This credit/financial
friction results in the so-called financial accelerator. Since in this
setup entrepreneurs borrow in credit markets to finance their
investment in capital, the strength of the financial accelerator as
amplificationmechanism crucially depends on the dynamics of the
price of capital.
In this paper, we analytically show that the procedure of ap-
proximating the price of previously-installed capital by the net-of-
depreciation price of new capital, as used in BGG, has important
first-order effects on the solution of a model that assumes a posi-
tive depreciation rate of capital together with investment adjust-
ment costs.1
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1 There is a large number of papers that use the same approximation to address
various questions. A non-exhaustive list includes: Bernanke andGertler (1999), Hall
and Vila (2002), Walentin (2005), Meier and Muller (2006), Gertler et al. (2007),
Christensen and Dib (2008), Dmitriev and Hoddenbagh (2015) and Carlstrom et al.
(2016), among others.In a nutshell, BGG set up the profit function of capital producers
under the implicit assumption that the capital depreciation rate
is zero. As we will demonstrate, only in that specific case
approximating the price of previously-installed capital by the net-
of-depreciation price of new capital, as suggested in BGG, is an
innocuous assumption because it does not generate any first-
order effects. However, since annual capital depreciation rate is
about 10%, it is important to understand the profound (first-
order) consequences of that approximation. After analytically
proving this point, we investigate how the strength of the financial
accelerator channel is quantitatively affected by the simplification.
We conclude that when the appropriate, and non-approximated,
price of capital is considered the financial accelerator effect is even
stronger than originally assessed.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review
the baseline BGG’s model. In Section 3 we demonstrate that
approximating the price of previously-installed capital by the net-
of-depreciation price of new capital has first-order effects when
the capital depreciation rate is greater than zero. In Section 4
we present the quantitative implications of accounting for the
equilibrium price of capital. In Section 5 we conclude with final
remarks.
2. Review of the financial accelerator framework
In order to contextualize the role playedby the price of capital in
determining the strength of the financial accelerator, in this section
we briefly summarize (Bernanke et al., 1999)’s framework.1
There are five types of agents in the economy: households, a fis-
cal and monetary authority, entrepreneurs, retailers, and capital-
producing firms. Since the economic problems of households, fis-
cal and monetary authorities, entrepreneurs, and retailers do not
affect at all our results, we omit their formal description. Instead,
in the next section we formalize the economic problem of capital-
producing firms, since it is at the core of our results.
Households. Households are risk averse and infinitely lived. They
get utility from consumption, leisure, and money holding. They
work, consume, pay taxes, hold money, and invest their savings, in
form of deposits, in a financial intermediary that pays the riskless
rate of return. These deposits are transferred to entrepreneurs in
the form of loanable funds. Households’ problem is standard: they
maximize the lifetime expected utility by choosing consumption,
hours worked, money holding, and savings, subject to the budget
constraint and taking all prices as given.
Fiscal and monetary authority. The government is subject to a
budget constraint that states that government expenditures are
financed by lump-sum taxes andmoney creation. The government
adjusts the mix of financing between money creation and taxes to
support a Taylor-type nominal interest rate rule.
The entrepreneurial sector. Entrepreneurs are risk neutral, own
the production technology, and have a constant probability of
surviving to the next period. They acquire physical capital from
capital-producing firms,whichwill be specified in the next section.
Capital and hired labor are combined to produce output through a
constant return to scale technology. Entrepreneurs finance capital
through their net worth and borrowing. The lender–borrower
relationship is characterized by a financial friction that originates
from asymmetric information about the realized return of capital.
At the aggregate level, BGG show that the demand for capital is
described by the expected gross return on holding a unit of capital
from period t to t + 1, which consists of the marginal product of
capital (MPK ) and capital gain, i.e.:
EtRkt+1 = Et

MPK t+1 + Q˜t+1
Qt

, (1)
where Et denotes the expectation operator conditional on the
information available at time t , andQt and Q˜t+1 represent the price
of newly-installed and previously-installed capital respectively.
The determination of these prices will be discussed in the next
section. In equilibrium,MPK is equal to the rental rate of capital:
MPK t+1 = rt+1 = At+1αKαt+1L1−αt+1 ,
where At is the aggregate technology shock, Kt is the capital stock,
Lt is labor input, and α is the capital share in output.2
The aggregate supply curve for investment finance is given by:
EtRkt+1 = s

Nt+1
QtKt+1

Rt+1, (2)
where Nt+1 is entrepreneurial net worth, Rt+1 is the risk-free
interest rate in the economy, and the function s(·) is the ratio of
the costs of external and internal finance. Through this function,
the investment supply curve in Eq. (2) incorporates the financial
frictions that characterize the economy, and it endogenously
creates an external-finance premium that follows from the conflict
of interests between borrowers and lenders. Notice that the
financial accelerator resulting from Eq. (2) crucially depends on the
evolution of the prices of capital Qt and Q˜t .
2 We have implicitly assumed a Cobb–Douglas production function, Yt =
AtKαt L
1−α
t , as in BGG.Retail sector and price setting. In order to account for nominal
rigidities, BGG assume the existence of a monopolistically com-
petitive retail sector subject to a price-setting decision a là (Calvo,
1983).
The crucial ingredient of the model for our results is the
determination of the prices of capital,Qt and Q˜t . Since, as suggested
by the equilibrium conditions (1) and (2), these two prices are one
of the key determinants of the strength of the financial accelerator,
we now formally describe how the two prices are determined.
3. Capital-producing firm and the price of capital
In order to understand how the prices of capital are determined,
it is useful to carefully describe the decentralized equilibrium of
the economy, in the same spirit as Christiano and Fisher (1995),
Christiano and Fisher (2003), Christiano and Davis (2006), and as
assumed in BGG.3 There are identical and perfectly competitive
capital-producing firms that purchase investment goods, It , and
old capital, Kt , to produce new capital, Kt+1, which will be sold to
entrepreneurs, using the following homogenous technology:
Kt+1 = Φ

It
Kt

Kt + (1− δ) Kt , (3)
whereΦ (·) is an increasing and concave adjustment cost function
that depends on the ratio of investment and capital, and δ is the
depreciation rate of capital.
After the entrepreneurs have used the acquired capital for
production purposes, they sell the used capital back to the capital-
producing firms. Hence, there are two relevant prices in this
setting: the price of newly-produced capital, Qt , and the price
of previously-installed capital, Q˜t . The representative capital-
producing firm buys used capital at the cost of Q˜tKt , invests a
total amount It , and sells new capital for a revenue of QtKt+1. The
problem of the representative capital-producing firm is then to
maximize profits given by:
max
Kt ,It
QtKt+1 − It − Q˜tKt (4)
s.t. Kt+1 = Φ

It
Kt

Kt + (1− δ) Kt .
The optimality conditions, which pin down the two equilibrium
prices, are:
Qt =

Φ ′

It
Kt
−1
, (5)
Q˜t =

(1− δ)+ Φ

It
Kt

− Φ ′

It
Kt

It
Kt

Qt . (6)
Notice that, while Eq. (5) is identical to the one derived in
BGG, the price of previously-installed capital in Eq. (6) differs from
theirs. Let us use Q¯t to denote BGG’s price of previously-installed
capital. They derive the following zero-profit condition4:
QtΦ

It
Kt

Kt + QtKt − It − Q¯tKt = 0, (7)
which gives:
Q¯t = QtΦ

It
Kt

− It
Kt
+ Qt .
Four remarks are necessary at this point. First, notice that BGG’s
profits in (7) are computed implicitly assuming that the capital
3 See footnote 12, p. 1356.
4 See footnote 13, p. 1357.2
depreciation rate, δ, is equal to zero. In fact, if and only if δ = 0
the profit function in Eq. (4) coincides with the one in Eq. (7).
Second, notice that the steady state value of Q˜t is Q˜ = 1 − δ,
whereas the steady state value of Q¯t is Q¯ = 1.5 Third, notice that
if we solve for the price of previously-installed capital by imposing
the zero-profit condition with non-zero depreciation rate, using
(4), we obtain Q˜t , since by (5), QtΦ ′

It
Kt

= 1. This should not
come as a surprise, since a homogenous technology as in (3) and
a competitive capital-producing market imply that the first order
conditions in (5) and (6) lead to profits being zero in equilibrium.
Fourth, as a consequence of all the previous points, whereas Q˜t is
always the equilibrium price level, Q¯t is the equilibrium price only
when δ = 0.
BGG argue that difference between Q¯t and Qt is of a second
order, and therefore replace the quantity (1 − δ)Qt+1 with Q˜t+1
in the expression for the return of capital (1).6 However, we argue
that the proposed approximation is appropriate only in the special
case when δ = 0, which is also the only case that makes Q¯t the
correct equilibrium price.
To see this, linearize the general expression for Q˜t , which is
computed without assuming zero capital depreciation. By totally
differentiating (6) around the steady state, and using (5), as well
as the fact that in the steady-state Φ
 I
K
 = δ, Φ ′  IK  = 1, and
I
K = δ, we have:
dQ˜t = (1− δ)dQt + δdQt .
As suggested by this expression, the approximation error dQ˜t+1 −
(1 − δ)dQt+1 equals δdQt+1. If δ = 0, then Q˜t+1 = Q¯t+1 and
the approximation Q¯t+1 ≈ (1 − δ)Qt+1 is indeed valid up to first
order. However, more generally, when δ > 0, then Q¯t+1 is not
an equilibrium price, as it is computed by equating an incorrect
profit equation to zero. In that case, then, using the approximation
(1− δ)Qt+1 leads to a first-order error departure from the correct
equilibrium price Q˜t+1.
The consequences of replacing Q˜t+1 with (1 − δ)Qt+1 when
the capital depreciation rate is not equal to zero are as follows.
Computing the profit of the capital-producing firm in Eq. (4) and
using the approximation Q˜t+1 = (1− δ)Qt+1, results in:
π kt = QtΦ

It
Kt

Kt − It .
Notice that the extra-profits resulting from the approximation,
i.e. QtKtΦ

It
Kt

− It are not zero even at first order. In fact, totally
differentiating that expression around the steady state, we obtain
that, up to first order, the extra profits are equal to δKdQt . This
should not come as a surprise, since the approximation Q˜t = Q¯t =
(1− δ)Qt is valid only when δ = 0.
The price of capital in the equilibrium system. In line with the
findings in the previous section, the solution of the model can be
found by augmenting the system of linearized equations with the
linearized version of the equilibrium condition for the return to
capital in Eq. (1) as a function of Q˜t , and of the equilibrium price
of capital Q˜t in Eq. (6). The linearized versions of the two altered
equilibrium conditions are:
Et rkt+1 = (1− ϵ)(yt+1 − kt+1 − xt+1)+ ϵq˜t+1 − qt , (8)
q˜t = − δϕ
(1− δ) it −
δϕ
(1− δ)kt + qt , (9)
5 Recall that the following relationships hold in the steady state of this model:
Φ
 I
K
 = δ,Φ ′  IK  = 1, and IK = δ.
6 It is important to understand that the factor (1 − δ) is included to take into
account the fact that Q˜t has a steady state level of (1− δ), whereas Qt and Q¯t have
both a steady state level of 1.where Xt is the gross markup of retail goods over wholesale goods,
ϵ = 1−δ
(1−δ)+αY/(XK) , ϕ = (
Φ(I/K)−1)′
(Φ(I/K)−1)′′
, and Y , X , K , I denote respective
steady state values.7
4. Quantitative effects
We now investigate the quantitative implications of explicitly
taking into account the correct price of old capital compared to
approximating it by the net-of-depreciation price of new capital.
We calibrate the model as in BGG, who fix the depreciation rate
of capital to δ = 0.025. As expected, we observe important
quantitative differences between the solution of the model
computed using BGG’s approximated price of old capital and the
model that uses the equilibrium price of old capital q˜t .
The financial accelerator is able to propagate and amplify
both real and nominal shocks to the economy. We first analyze
the impulse response functions to a one standard-deviation
technology shock (Fig. 1(a)) andmonetary policy shock (Fig. 1(b)).8
The dashed lines represent the impulse response functions when
BGG’s approximation for the price of capital is used, whereas
the solid lines represent the impulse response functions when
the equilibrium price of capital, q˜t , is used instead. As displayed
in the figures, the impulse response functions implied by the
two approaches are quite different. This evidence supports our
analytical results; in fact, if using q˜t did not have any first-order
effect, the impulse response functions across the two approaches
would be exactly identical, since the model is solved up to a first-
order approximation.
As Fig. 1(a) displays, accounting for the equilibrium price of
old capital results in much larger responses of investment, output,
net worth, and rental rate of capital to a technology shock than
in BGG. It appears that the financial accelerator is even stronger
than reported in the original paper. A similar result applies to
a monetary policy shock, as displayed in Fig. 1(b); a shock that
increases the nominal interest rate has larger real effects when
the equilibrium price of capital is considered rather than its
approximation as in BGG. The differences in the responses of
consumption, capital, and net worth are particularly noticeable.9
5. Conclusions
This paper shows that approximating the price of previously-
installed capital by the net-of-depreciation price of new capital,
as suggested in Bernanke et al. (1999), has distorting first-order
effects on the equilibrium of an economy with positive capital
depreciation rate. After proving this point, we show the set of
equilibrium conditions that take into account the appropriate
equilibrium price of used capital. We then quantify the effects of
accounting for the equilibrium price of capital and we conclude
that the financial accelerator mechanism is even stronger than
originally assessed.We believe, therefore, that this paper transmits
a positivemessage and that it will be beneficial to researchers who
use this approach to study financial frictions.
7 It is straightforward to incorporate the equilibrium price of previously-
installed capital in (9) and the associated return to capital in (8) in the set of
linearized equilibrium condition described in BGG (p. 1361). Codes for solving
the model with the equilibrium price of capital, q˜t , are available at the website:
http://www.robertopancrazi.com/BGG99_qtilde.txt and are based on the codes in
Cesa-Bianchi and Fernandez-Corugedo (2014).
8 The replication files for these figures are available at the website:
http://www.robertopancrazi.com/research.html.
9 Similar results are obtained when we apply the same strategy to model with
delayed investment extension described in BGG in section 4.2.1.3
(a) Technology shock. (b) Monetary shock.
Fig. 1. Impulse response function: Benchmark model. Note: These plots display the IRFs to a one-standard deviation technology shock (left panel) and to a one-standard
deviation monetary policy shock (right panel). The solid blue lines correspond to the model solved including the equilibrium price of capital q˜t , whereas the dashed blue
lines correspond to the model solved including the approximated price of capital as in Bernanke et al. (1999). (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)Acknowledgments
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